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Biographical Note 
 
Al From was born in South Bend, Indiana.  He grew up as an only child in a Jewish family, 
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Muskie’s Intergovernmental Relations Committee and stayed on his staff until 1978.  He then 
became Jimmy Carter’s deputy advisor on inflation, then as staff director for Gillis Long, who 
became the Chair of the Democratic Caucus in 1980.  From created the Democratic Leadership 
Council (DLC) in 1985 and the Progressive Policy Institute in 1989.  In 1991, he recruited Bill 
Clinton to be chairman of the DLC. 
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Transcript 
 
Don Nicoll:   It is Friday the 1st of December in the year 2000.  We are at 600 Pennsylvania 
Avenue S.E. in Washington, D.C. in the offices of the Democratic Leadership Council, and Don 
Nicoll is interviewing Al From.  Al, would you state your full name, spell it and give us your 
date and place of birth? 
 
Alvin From:   My full name, believe it or not, is Alvin, A-L-V-I-N, From, F-R-O-M.  I was born 
in South Bend, Indiana on May 31st, 1943 which makes me fifty-seven years old. 
 
DN:   You’re approaching middle age. 
 
AF:   Right, I think I’m long past middle age. 
 
DN:   What did your father and mother do? 
 
AF:    My father was a small businessman.  He was in a whole host of business activities from 
the coal business to a little while in the junk business, in the auto parts business, had a hardware 
store for a couple years, but in the early 1950s I think, 1951, settled down and became a small 
contractor.  And actually in retrospect, as I look back on it, was one of the original niche 
marketers because he built garages.  And what he apparently realized was that in the aftermath of 
WWII, there were all these sort of prefabricated suburbs that were being built and none of them 
had garages and in northern Indiana where we lived you needed garages in the winter, and he 
made a lot of money on that. 
 
DN:   These were garages for houses. 
 
AF:    For houses.  My mother was just a housewife who helped him in the office. 
 
DN:   Did you have siblings? 
 
AF:    No, I was an only child. 
 
DN:   What was it like growing up in South Bend in the postwar period? 
 
AF:    Well, it was fascinating growing up in a Jewish family in South Bend, which obviously is 
a Catholic town, with Notre Dame, after WWII.  I would say we had a rather provincial 
upbringing, you know.  It was, we had, my father had two brothers and three sisters and my 
mother had three brothers and most of our social activities were with the family.  We had very 
few family friends, I mean that I recall, and did very little outside the family so it was very, and 
my guess is that in the years immediately following WWII for a lot of Jewish families that was 
not an unusual circumstance. 
 
DN:   Was your family a practicing family so that you were involved in the synagogue or 
temple? 
 
AF:    Yes, I mean to this day my father who is now ninety-one and can barely remember 
anything puts on his tefillen every morning, and we kept a kosher home.  And while we weren’t 
orthodox, we were clearly on the orthodox side of conservative. 
 
DN:   So you had a fairly strong religious upbringing. 
 
AF:    I had a pretty strong religious upbringing. 
 
DN:   Did -? 
 
AF:    I was always a little bit of a rebel though, so. 
 
DN:   Now did you attend public school? 
 
AF:    I attended public schools, went to public schools in South Bend, graduated from a public 
high school, and then got a scholarship to Northwestern in journalism and got my bachelor’s and 
master’s degree in journalism at Northwestern.  One of the great ironies . . . .  I’ll just tell you a 
couple of little quick stories.  One of the great ironies of that was that I got a McCormick 
Scholarship.  Colonel [Robert R.] McCormick, as long term owner and publisher of the Chicago 
Tribune, was at least in the Jewish community viewed as pretty anti-Semitic and I always used to 
think he would have been very surprised to realize that his scholarship probably made my career. 
 
DN:   Was this an undergraduate or a graduate scholarship? 
 
AF:    It was both.  Actually, it was a five-year program for a graduate degree.  But one thing, 
South Bend was a small town and while our family was, I would say, a reasonably prominent 
family in the Jewish community with all my father’s brothers and sisters, the, you know, we 
were basically a lower middle class to a middle class family, I mean we didn’t have any money.  
And I always like to tell this story, my biggest thrill in politics in, when I grew up in South Bend 
was when I was ten years old a guy who became elec-, was elected mayor of the city came to our 
apartment build to drive somebody to the polls on election day during a snowstorm and I got to 
meet him, and that was a pretty big thrill.  I celebrated my fiftieth birthday party in the State 
dining room at the White House.  I just think America’s a great country. 
 
DN:   Now, you have mentioned the fact that your involvements, your social involvements were 
pretty much with the family.  Did you suffer any explicit discrimination that you recall growing 
up? 
 
AF:    I didn’t.  You know, my father used to talk about stories of, of when he and his friends 
were in Hebrew school having stone fights with neighborhood kids and all those kind of things.  
I never suffered any of that.  And my generation in my family broke out of that provincialism 
very rapidly.  I was in high school, I went into high school in 1958, started high school in 1958 
which was the year after Sputnik, or the year of Sputnik.  And if you recall in those days there 
was a big push to accelerate the education in the United States so that we wouldn’t lag behind 
the Russians in the space effort and they started all these advanced placement classes.  And I was 
put with a group of about twenty-five kids in my high school which whom I had almost every 
class for four years in this accelerated program.  But we were also, it was also right at the 
beginning stirrings of the civil rights movement and so at least my friends and I moved out pretty 
quickly into a lot of other activities.  We got far beyond sort of the social limitations that we had 
growing up. 
 
DN:   How did your family feel about the changes that you were going through in terms of 
political awareness and involvement? 
 
AF:    I think they found, were perfectly fine with that.  I mean the truth is that when you’re an 
only child it’s hard to do too much wrong. 
 
DN:   What kinds of political discussions took place in your family as you were growing up? 
 
AF:    Well, you know, it’s a very funny thing but my first political memory was going to the 
polls with my folks in 1948, I was five years old.  Harry Truman was the hero in our household 
because he recognized Israel.  But when we went to the polls, and I just have this memory, the, I 
remember somebody putting a big Dewey button on me and I, because I remember wearing this 
big Dewey button, this is sort of my first political memory.  My father, Harry Truman probably 
made him a Democrat forever.  He always talked about Roosevelt, but he also talked about 
Wendell Willkie who was a Hoosier who ran in 1940 obviously against Roosevelt. 
 
I can’t say that we had the kind of political discussions, for example, that I might have with my 
younger daughter, who is now a senior at Vassar.  Because when I was growing up my family, 
my, and my father was pretty concentrated on, basically on trying to make a living as a small 
contractor who ran his business out of his house and out of a couple of yards that, lumber yards 
that were owned by his family.  My grandfather had been in the coal business and had two coal 
yards and we used one of them for storage of lumber that my dad needed to use.  And so he used 
to spend most nights selling, and then during the day would supervise his construction crews, so 
I mean, we didn’t have time for much else. 
 
The most important thing I suppose and I remember about my youth in South Bend, other than 
my always a little bit of a rebellious nature trying to break out, was that my father demanded 
unbelievable excellence.  He had gone to Purdue for a little while and to Notre Dame for a little 
while but never got his degree, because his father died when he was about, either in college or 
about ready to go to college and he came back to work.  But he was bound and determined that I 
would go to college and, if I would get a B in high school, he would be in there talking to the 
teachers which made me very eager not to get any Bs. 
 
DN:   You had plenty of incentive to excel. 
 
AF:    Right, right. 
 
DN:   What led you to choose journalism as a career and in going to college? 
 
AF:    You know, I think, I’m trying to, I think the first, my sort of my first brushes with 
journalism were in, when I was in high school starting writing, writing sports for the high school 
newspaper.  And I was sports editor of the high school newspaper in my junior year.  Gosh, I 
haven’t even thought about this in a long time, I did this column called From Al by Al From, and 
then became editor of the newspaper.  And after my junior year in high school, between my 
junior and senior year in high school I went to, Northwestern had something called the National 
High School Institute which was a five-week program they did in journalism and tech and 
education and speech and a couple other disciplines.  And I went to the journalism one and I 
guess I got hooked, decided I wanted to Northwestern journalism school and applied early and 
got in, got my scholarship and went off to Northwestern where I devoted most of my college 
career to the Daily Northwestern which I edited in my senior year. 
 
DN:   After you graduated where did you head? 
 
AF:    I was, I was signed and sealed but not delivered to the Chicago Daily News in 1966.  And 
in my graduate year, I was supposed to start in June of 1966 or July of 1966 in Chicago with the 
old Chicago Daily News which is no longer in existence, and in March of 1966 I was part of the 
inaugural group for a Washington program for the journalism school at Northwestern, the Medill 
News Service.  And there were about a dozen of us who came out here and our job was to cover 
Washington for a bunch of small newspapers.  I had done my master’s thesis on [William] 
Hodding Carter’s newspaper, the Delta Democrat Times in Greenville, Mississippi and so, and 
so I got Hodding to get his program, his paper into the program.  And I got the South Bend 
Tribune, my sponsor for my scholarship at Northwestern, to be part of the program so I had these 
two very good papers.  And I had great fun, the, mostly through Harding Carter I got to know 
people like John Doar, who was then the assistant attorney general for civil rights, and I just got 
smitten by Washington. 
 
And I ran into a friend of mine named Edgar May, who you probably know.  He was a state 
senator in Vermont and his sister is Madeleine Kunin, who was governor of Vermont.  And Ed 
May was working for [Robert] Sargent Shriver in the War on Poverty, he had been a 
Northwestern journalism school grad, a Pulitzer Prize winner, and I had met him at school and I 
saw him when I was out here.  And he said to me, “You don’t want to go back to Chicago, 
you’re having too much fun here.”  “Why don’t you get in the fray and try to change things?” 
and asked me to go to work in the War on Poverty where he was working for Sargent Shriver.  
And I said, “Okay.”  And I called the Chicago Daily News and said, “I’m not coming back.”  
And I went to work for Shriver and Ed May in the War on Poverty and my life was changed 
from that point on. 
 
AF:    The Chicago Tribune and the McCormick Foundation gave me my scholarship, but the 
paper I was going to go to work for was the Chicago Daily News which is no longer in existence. 
 And I actually did work as a stringer for the Tribune while I was in college.  In those days it was 
big money, I got fifteen bucks a week to call in every day and tell them there was nothing 
happening at Northwestern.  And when I did call in and tell them that something was happening, 
often the city editor, whose name I won’t mention because he’s pretty well known, but had very 
conservative and very narrow views in those days, would just reject it.  Like I called him one 
time to tell him that I’d interviewed Reverend James Bevel, who was one of Martin Luther 
King’s lieutenants, who was up in Evanston speaking at Northwestern.  And he sort of told me 
that King was going to come to Chicago and I called the Tribune and I said, “I’ve got this story.  
Martin Luther King’s going to come to Chicago.”  And they said, “We don’t care what they,” (a 
few not particularly on color remarks) and about two weeks later it was the lead story in the 
Chicago Sun Times. 
 
DN:   What was the date that you went to work for the poverty program? 
 
AF:    It was in I think, I think, I can’t tell you the exact date, I think, well it was June of 1966, I 
think it was the 26th but I’m not absolutely sure. 
 
DN:   And what was your assignment there? 
 
AF:    I had the best job in the world for somebody coming out of school.  Schriver, I was in the, 
I worked in something called the Office of Inspection.  Schriver did not trust the bureaucrats to 
tell him what was going on around the country, so he hired a bunch of young journalists and 
lawyers and sent them out around the country, and our job was to go look at what was happening 
and write the equivalent of in-depth magazine pieces on for him, on what was happening in anti-
poverty programs around the country.  And I got assigned to the Deep South which was 
Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee, South Carolina and Florida.  And in 1966, in the 
aftermath of the civil rights movement, that was the most exciting place in the country to do this 
kind of thing, and it was a terrific job. 
 
DN:   How long did you do that? 
 
AF:    I stayed until the people of the United States decided that Richard Nixon should be 
president.  Not that I had a political job, but I just decided I couldn’t stay in a Nixon 
administration.  And so I was there for two and a half years but I had, in the middle of that, I 
spent four months in the Army at Fort Bragg and Fort Eustis and then, as my basic training and 
advanced individual training before, as part of my Reserve obligation.  And then in, when, in 
1968 when Hubert Humphrey and Ed Muskie couldn’t quite pull it off the, I decided I was, there 
wasn’t really any point in my staying at the War on Poverty in the Nixon administration so I 
started looking up on the Hill.  And I left OEO right about the time that Nixon took office and in 
the beginning of February of 1969 went to work on the Hill for Joe Tydings in the Senate district 
committee. 
 
DN:   And what led you to Senator Tydings’ office? 
 
AF:    I wrote a lot of people and I guess this is on, probably in, this was probably in October of 
‘68, a time when I’m sure you remember well, probably much better than I do, that our ticket 
was lagging a little bit in the polls, and figuring that I’m probably going to have to get out I 
wrote a bunch of senators.  I got an interview with Tydings’ office, with John McEvoy, who’s 
our mutual friend.  And he, I was interviewing at that time for a press secretary’s job and as it 
turned out, after the election, that job went to somebody who was a, who had been working in 
the Humphrey-Muskie campaign.  But in, at the beginning of the next Congress, Tydings got the 
chairmanship of the district committee and called me. 
 
DN:   And what was your assignment at the district committee? 
 
AF:    I was sort of the, I was the counsel of the district committee but I was really sort of the 
chief investigator.  What I’d do is I did a bunch of hearings on drug abuse and crime in the 
national Capitol.  And so what I would, my, what I basically did was, did in, you know, we went 
out, looked at what was happening in the district governmentally and wrote a lot of memos on it 
and then turned those memos into hearings. 
 
DN:   Now was this an extension of the techniques that you developed when you were working 
for Sargent Shriver? 
 
AF:    Oh probably a little bit.  We also did, you know, began to learn how to draft legislation a 
little bit.  But I would, I mean the, I would guess I would say that the, my limited sk-, my, you 
know, my, I only learn how to do things one way and my skills are pretty limited, but it’s sort of 
going out, finding out what’s going on, writing it down and then figuring out how to present it.  
So those are the skills I use.  I learned those in journalism school, I used them for Shriver, I’ve 
used them ever since. 
 DN:   And you were with the district committee from 1969 until when? 
 
AF:    I think it was April of 1971.  Tydings got beat in the ‘70 election, in fact Tydings and Al 
Gore’s dad, Albert Gore, who were the two senators who got beat in 1970, the only two that 
Senator Muskie couldn’t save with that wonderful election eve speech.  And the, but, and then 
Senator Tom Eagleton became chairman of the district committee.  And I had actually, I 
probably would have wound up working for Eagleton had Tydings not called me for the district 
committee in 1968.  And so Eagleton asked me to stay on, and then through some magic which 
I’m not quite sure I ever quite understood, I got traded to Muskie for a couple of draft choices in 
April 1971.  I got, McEvoy and I guess you and others brought me over to work for Muskie in 
1971 and a couple of people that were on Muskie’s intergovernmental relations subcommittee 
were moved over to the district committee. 
 
DN:   And when you went to work for Senator Muskie it was directly on the subcommittee? 
 
AF:    I worked first as counsel on the intergovernmental relations subcommittee and then, I 
think I went to work there, I want to say in April of 1971.  And then, and the staff director at that 
time, was an attorney named Ty Brown, Tyrone Brown, who had worked in the campaign in ‘68 
I think.  Or maybe he had started in the, had started in the campaign in, for president, in 1970 
and then in ‘71 moved up on the Hill.  And he left to practice law.  He was later an FCC 
commissioner, in, like in November or December.  And Muskie made me staff director after that, 
which I, the job I held until the end of 1978 when he left the committee. 
 
DN:   And had you known Senator Muskie at all before going to work for the subcommittee? 
 
AF:    Not at all, only by reputation.  I mean, everybody knew Senator Muskie in those days 
because he was sort of our hero coming out of the 1968 campaign and . . . . But I never knew, I 
did not know Senator Muskie at all personally until I went to work for him.  I’m trying to 
remember, I think the first time I ever met him was when I did a bunch of revenue sharing 
hearings in early, in April or May of 1971. 
 
DN:   That was after you went to work for (unintelligible word)? 
 
AF:    Yes. 
 
DN:   And what was, were your impressions of him when you met him and started working with 
him the same as those you had at a distance? 
 
AF:    Well, I guess, you know, it’s probably hard to differentiate now after, you know, so long, 
both being with him and so long being apart.  But one of the things I’ve learned is, I’ve had to 
recount a lot of the history of the early Clinton years now, is that your memory over the years 
begin, tends to be a straight line.  There’s a book written on sort of the DLC and the change in 
the Democratic Party through the Clinton years, all of which incidentally started, its roots were 
in the Muskie years, in my years with Muskie.  But the, but when I read that book what it 
reminded me is how many ups and downs there were along the way, because I just sort of 
remember it as a straight trajectory as you get farther away from it. 
 
But, you know, the thing I always remember about Senator Muskie is, you know, he’s sort of a 
towering figure in many ways.  He’s tall, a man of just incredible intellect.  I don’t think I’ve 
ever seen anybody who is as smart as Senator Muskie, a man who is extraordinarily thoughtful.  
The, I’ve done a lot of national politics since, probably got, had some experience that probably 
would have been useful in those days when we were trying to win the presidency in 1972.  But 
you seldom, seldom in national politics do you find anybody who is as thoughtful and as 
conscientious as Muskie. 
 
And then the other side of Muskie was his temper, and maybe it’s just my way, but I always, you 
know, I sort of quickly sized that up.  I mean, my favorite story is with, you know, I was walking 
down the hall with Muskie one time and he’s just screaming at me about something.  I can’t 
remember what I did, probably something stupid, and he saw in the distance some people from 
Maine.  And as they got into sort of earshot range he stops yelling and he introduces me like I 
was the king, and then as soon as they were out of earshot range he picks up in mid-sentence. 
 
But, you know, Senator Muskie, the other thing I remember about Senator Muskie is that I must 
say I just, it had a profound influence on my own political way, is this intense loyalty.  I 
remember one time in the subcommittee Muskie used to give us incredible latitude to deal on his 
behalf, and I made a deal that he just flat out disagreed with.  I mean, he thought I had just made 
the stupidest thing, did the stupidest thing I ever could have.  And he just let me know it, as he 
was known to do in no uncertain terms, and then we go into the subcommittee meeting and he 
argued for the deal I made.  And I said, “Why are you doing that?”  He said, “Because if,” you 
know, “if your word’s no good then you can’t deal on my behalf.”  I mean, that just, I mean, just, 
those incredible qualities that very few, you know, you’d see senators, so many senators who 
would, if their staff did something they disagreed with would just undercut them and then, you 
know, which made us a lot less eager to make deals in the future.  Muskie always understood 
that. 
 
DN:   You mentioned having a lot of latitude, how did you acquire or discover you had that 
latitude? 
 
AF:    I assume you just sort of, you know, well, I guess the, my case was probably pretty, was 
pretty unique for a couple of reasons.  One is, I was a second committee for Muskie which 
meant, my guess is that Leon Billings had Muskie much more on his tail than I did on mine, 
because Leon worked on what was his first committee on public works, his environmental work. 
 Government operations was sort of a second committee.  Government operations by its nature 
was more of a staff committee, staff driven than maybe other committees.  But the other, so, but, 
so the one circumstance was it was a second committee. 
 
But the other circumstance that I think was probably really important was that my first two years 
with Muskie were his presidential years so he went around a lot.  And, you know, one of the 
things, you know, I’ve always, you know, been very thankful for in Muskie and later in other 
bosses I’ve had like Gillis Long, they’ve always for whatever reason have, been willing to give 
me some latitude.  And, you know, I don’t know whether it was bec-, I assumed that there was 
some reason that he decided that I was able to get this, you know, whether he, the early work I 
did for him he thought was pretty good, whether, you know, guys like you and McEvoy and 
others who were close to him encouraged it.  But in part, you know, I suppose because he wasn’t 
around a lot, I had to do a lot more wheeling and dealing than I would have, on my own, than I 
would have if he had been in the Senate in 1971 and the early part of 1972. 
 
DN:   Did you observe him providing similar latitude to other staff members, to John, to Leon, to 
others? 
 
AF:    Well it’s, it, you know, it was hard for me to tell.  I assume Leon had a lot of latitude, 
even though Leon, you know, Muskie spent a lot more personal time with Leon.  I mean as you 
remember when Asbell wrote his book, you know, the, Leon’s work was the sort of the 
centerpiece of it and the counter cyclical revenue sharing was sort of the second story in it, 
which I handled.  And, you know, I think that, you know, I re-, you know, I really don’t know 
how much latitude he gave other people but I, I would, I mean just based on the way he worked 
with me I would assume that if he had some trust in you he gave you latitude.  If he didn’t, he 
could be a pretty strong and overbearing force. 
 
DN:   As you worked those years, almost ten years on the committee, what were the major issues 
that emerged and that you dealt with? 
 
AF:    Well you know, intergovernmental relations subcommittee was really a small committee, 
a small subcommittee when we, in 1971 when I went there, and we turned it into one of the 
major subcommittees in the Senate.  We did a whole host of things.  We did revenue sharing.  
We did counter cyclical revenue sharing.  We did a lot of freedom of information stuff.  We were 
engaged, at least initially, in the CIA investigations in the mid-seventies.  We were, we did the 
Sunset Bill, which became a major defining issue for us.  We did the, the most important thing 
we ever did was the Congressional Budget Act, which gave Muskie his chairmanship.  We did a 
bunch of stuff on urban policy, and then we did some of the nuts and bolts things. 
 
We had this little bill that, it was really a pretty important bill and you come to appreciate some 
of these things as you get older, the Uniform Relocation Act which was the bill that compensated 
citizens when the government moved in to do a project and took away their property.  The, I 
learned one of my most important lessons on the reauthorization of that bill one year because we 
had to, we had to amend that act to modernize it because the, with inflation the amounts were far 
too low, and we passed it.  The House was blocking it for some reason.  We finally got it passed 
in the House a week before the end of the session, I think this was, I can’t remember whether it 
was ‘72 or ‘74, it must have been ‘7-, maybe ‘72.  And Muskie had worked in the, and we went 
to conference and got a conference report a week before the session was ending. 
 
At the same time Muskie was involved deeply in negotiations I think it was on either the Clean 
Air or Clean Water Act, I can’t remember which one.  I think it was Clean Water, and that went 
to the final day.  And for some reason the committee that we dealt with in, the House counterpart 
to us on Uniform Relocation was also the public works committee which did the environmental 
bills.  And so finally on the last day of the session the, this was probably ‘74 actually.  It was the 
last day of the session.  We’re in conference on the public, on the, I think the Clean Water Act or 
Clean Air Act, and we got an agreement.  And the papers came around for Muskie to sign that 
agreement and Muskie said, “I’m not going to sign it until we file the conference report on the 
Uniform Relocation Act.”  Because what had happened is Dick Sullivan, who had been the staff 
director of the public works committee over there, had just taken that report, the conference 
report, and held it because he wanted to use it as leverage on Muskie on the environmental bill.  
And so they made an agreement that bef-, if Muskie signed the conference report, they’d first file 
the conference report on Uniform Relocation and on the Clean Air Act, I think it was Clean Air 
Act.  And what happened was we lost the vote because they couldn’t get it through.  It was the 
last day of the session, everybody was gone, they couldn’t, the Republicans asked for a quorum 
and we couldn’t get it.  But I’ll never forget that. 
 
I got Sullivan back the next year though, because we did the Counter Cyclical Revenue Sharing 
Bill and we passed it over the objection of Russell Long who was, really had jurisdiction but we 
just assumed jurisdiction.  One of the things we did in those days is we, we were an aggressive 
subcommittee and we just, Muskie thought that this was a good idea, Muskie and I thought it 
was a good idea.  And so we got enough support in our committee and we reported this bill out 
of our committee and then offered it as an amendment to a public works bill that had come over 
from the House, over Russell Long’s objections, and . . . . 
 
DN:   Were his objections procedural or jurisdictional? 
 
AF:    They were mostly jurisdictional.  They probably also had to do with the fact that the 
formula in our counter cyclical revenue sharing was to help places that were hurt by the 
recession in ‘74 and ‘75.  And Louisiana was doing, in those days Louisiana and Texas, the oil 
belt, were doing very well and got very little money out of that formula because it was really a 
targeted formula.  But in any event, so we passed this and part of the deal was, we had gone to 
Tip O’Neill who was the majority leader in those days.  And Tip said, “If you put this, put your 
bill on the speaker’s public works bill I’ll make sure the House takes it in conference.” 
 
And I’ll never forget sitting in that conference, you know, with the House guys saying they 
weren’t going to take this bill.  And Tip calls, and he doesn’t call Jim Wright who was the, I 
think the chairman of the conference.  He doesn’t call Kluczynski who was the chairman of the 
subcommittee.  He calls Dick Sullivan, who was the staff director of the committee, and Sullivan 
comes back and they took it.  And we finally, after two vetoes got it overwritten, but that was my 
revenge on Dick Sullivan. 
 
DN:   Now, you - 
 
AF:    Who incidentally is a great guy and a very good friend of mine, but he taught me a lot and 
I hope I taught him something. 
 
DN:   He had served through several chairmen as I recall. 
 
AF:    Right, I think, there was a story at one point in the New York Times that said Sullivan was 
more powerful than all but about thirty-five of the four hundred and thirty-five members of the 
House. 
 
DN:   You mentioned the aggressiveness of the subcommittee.  Where did that aggressiveness 
come from?  Was it Senator Muskie, was it Al From, was it a combination? 
 
AF:    I think it’s probably a combination.  I mean, I, you know, there’s some people who think 
I’m aggressive but I, and, but I think the, I think what happened, there were a couple things.  
One, probably the most important actually, was that government operations in those days was 
sort of an all purpose committee and Muskie being, coming out of the ‘68 and then ‘72 
campaigns was a national figure.  And it gave us an opportunity to get our hands into a lot of 
things that we might otherwise not, and he always had a lot of interest in doing that.  And so I 
think part of it was that Muskie was such a dominant legislator.  And so if something came up, I 
mean, just to give you an example of something that would change the course of American 
history, and I think was one of the most important things in, that led, you know, ironically almost 
twenty years later, to the Clinton presidency because it helped change our party. 
 
I’ll never forget sitting with Muskie one day when he was still sort of smarting from what 
happened in 1972 and the way the Nixon crowd, you know, sabotaged his campaign.  And the, I 
may get these numbers wrong, but somewhere in all these memoranda that are piled up here on 
this table, that are all in the library incidentally, I would make copies and send them all to the 
library with the right numbers.  But I think it was, I think Nixon sent a budget up in the end of 
1972 of, for that fiscal year, of something like two hundred and forty-eight point seven [248.7] 
billion dollars, I mean some, it was either two forty-seven point eight [247.8], or two forty-eight 
point seven [248.7].  And Chuck Percy, who was on the committee, offered an amendment to 
some bill that was going through the committee to put a spending ceiling on, at the Nixon level, 
two for-, I think it was two forty-seven point eight [247.8], and Muskie turned to me and said in 
words that I will not repeat here, “What’s so sacred about two hundred forty seven point eight 
[247.8] billion dollars?”  And immediately offered an amendment to make it two hundred forty-
seven [247] billion.  Just because that’s just the way he was sometimes. 
 
And that whole battle sort of triggered a process that got, that led to the creation of a commission 
that Senator McClellan led to study the budget process that in turn within six months led to the 
development of the Budget Act that created the budget committees and the Congressional 
Budget Office.  But, you know, Muskie’s legislative dominance was so incredible.  We were in, 
the Budget Act was done in a different subcommittee than ours, in fact they created a 
subcommittee for Lee Metcalf in 1973 and gave him the Budget Act.  Nobody thought that that 
was going to turn out to be such an important deal.  But we were on that subcommittee and 
Muskie just didn’t like the way it was going, the discussions were going.  The Congress in, I 
think the late forties, had attempted to create a budget process and they had done it too rigidly, 
and it had collapsed of its own weight within a year. 
 
And Muskie thought that the bill that Senator [Sam] Ervin and Senator [John] McClellan with 
Percy I think had put in was, had the same problem.  He wasn’t quite sure why, but he just had 
that instinct that it wasn’t going to work.  And so we went to a mark-up one day and this was, I’ll 
never forget this, I mean, Muskie just started talking and he talked for forty-five minutes about 
his concerns about this. 
 
End of Side A 
Side B 
 
DN:   . . . . the tape of the interview with Al From, December 1st, the year 2000.  Al, you were 
just talking about Senator Muskie and the budget (unintelligible word). 
 
AF:    We were in this mark up on the Budget Act and Muskie was just not comfortable with the 
rigidity of the bill.  And so he started, he just got the floor and started talking and talked for 
forty-five minutes and sort of outlined his arguments of why he was concerned, said he wasn’t 
quite sure, you know, how we ought to remedy it, that.  Then as he, as Muskie was wont to do, 
put it in a historical perspective.  And at the end of that Bill Brock, who was a freshman senator 
and to that point not much of a friend of ours, came up to me and he said, “You know, Ed is 
absolutely right and if he’s willing to deal with something we used to call back door spending, 
then I’d love to sit down with him and see if we can’t do an alternative.”  So I went to Muskie 
and I said, “Bill Brock came up to me and said ‘if you’re willing to deal with back door spending 
we could do an alternative,’ he wants to work with you on an alternative.”  And Muskie said, 
“Sure, I want to do it.”  I said, “Now you understand that you just passed over the president’s 
veto in 1972, the largest back door spending bill ever,” which was the Clean Water Act.  And he 
said, “Yeah, I know I did that and it’s not the way we ought to legislate, it’s the way we had to 
legislate.” 
 
And so Bill Brock and Ed Muskie and Charlie Shultz and one staff guy from Brock and me went 
down to that wonderful hideaway we used to have called SB4 in the basement of the Capitol 
down by the garbage dumps, and one afternoon designed what was the, (unintelligible word) 
became the Budget Act.  And Muskie and Brock presented it as an alternative.  And you know, 
we sort of worked it through committee and, by Muskie’s really legislative skill which, you 
know, was astonishing, beat the two, you know, ranking Democrats on the committee, Ervin the 
chairman and McClellan who was really the ranking member, got them to finally compromise to 
our bill. 
 
And then went through a whole process where, with Senator Bob Byrd, who tried to represent 
the interests of all the committee chairs, ‘cause one of the things the Budget Act did was sort of 
harness the free reign of the committee chairs.  And Byrd, who had his own fish to fry with the 
leadership and knew the rules better than anybody else, who could put us through this awful 
process in the rules committee for seven weeks night and day.  He had, the staff directors of the 
subcom-, of the committees met trying to redo this Budget Act and somehow we were able to 
withstand it all and in the end come out with pretty much the bill that Muskie and Brock had put 
in. 
 
But so, you know, when you, I guess what started me on this was the aggressiveness of the 
committee, and part of it was just when Muskie got into an issue he just, he dominated it.  You 
know, in, at the beginning of, in, I guess this was at the end of 1974, Sy Hirsch did a bunch of 
stories on the CIA.  And I had made a deal with Bob Smith, who was Ervin’s staff director of the 
committee, who wanted to borrow a staff member of mine to help Ervin on his Privacy Bill.  And 
I said, “Okay, we’ll do that but the deal is that when CIA reform bills get in they come, they’re 
referred to intergovernmental relations.”  And he agreed to that and so that happens. 
 
Well, when that happened, we had a committee chairmanship change, Ribicoff became chairman 
and he wanted to keep these bills and so we made some sort of, I can’t remember what kind of a 
deal, but we sort of jointly worked on those things.  But we had had some dates scheduled for 
CIA hearings and when you got hearing dates on Muskie’s schedule you didn’t want to give 
them up even if you didn’t want to do those hearings.  And so we decided to do hearings on the 
fiscal conditions of states and cities, this is like in January of ‘75 I think, and from that we 
decided to put in this bill called Counter Cyclical Revenue Sharing. 
 
But the point is, what we were always trying to do was see what the, you know, hot issue was 
and then see if we could move into it.  And I think it was a combination of Muskie’s sort of 
dominance of an issue when he got into it, and sort of my natural aggressive nature that made 
that, that turned that subcommittee.  I think by the time I left it was next to permanent 
investigations for the largest subcommittee in the senate. 
 
DN:   How did Senator Muskie deal with his colleagues who were also fairly strong-willed 
people and had a tendency to dominate?  After all, Sam Irvine had been a towering figure in his 
own right, and John McClellan had run that committee in earlier years with an iron hand. 
 
AF:    Well, Muskie actually dealt with those senior members.  I mean, a lot of, I mean Muskie’s 
mere presence overwhelmed a lot of members of that committee.  But he dealt, it was fascinating 
actually the way he dealt, I mean he dealt very skillfully with McClellan and I’ll give you an 
example of that.  The, with Erv-, Ervin was a really interesting relationship.  I mean, Muskie was 
no shrinking violet as you well know, but you know, and if a senator would ask him to do 
something that he didn’t want to do he’d grumble at us, you know, at least.  He may not say 
anything to him but he’d certainly grumble at us.  But when Ervin asked him something it was 
different, he’d call me over and say, “Senator Ervin asked me to do this, can I, is it possible we 
can do this?”  I mean, I think Muskie had enormous respect for Irvine as, you know, as, you 
know, as the great Constitutional lawyer that he was.  And I, so I think, the only senator I think 
that Muskie really, that I ever saw him really defer to was Ervin. 
 
You know, there are other senators like Russell Long, he thought he was going to try to strangle 
every time he saw him, but, and we had incredible battles.  The McClellan thing is interesting.  
But the time I was there McClellan had taken over the appropriations committee basically, I 
mean, I’ll tell you two stories actually about McClellan, one before, when he was still chairman 
of (unintelligible phrase), and one when he was, after he took over appropriations. 
 
But Muskie, I think Muskie and McClellan probably had a pretty good relationship that certainly 
preceded my time there, because the first story was during the, during the Muskie presidential 
campaign.  The, we did a lot of work as Senate offices were prone to do in those days, when the 
rules were not quite as tight, that we reinforced the campaign including, I had a bunch of 
volunteers who were sitting in our subcommittee office, interestingly enough not paid by the 
subcommittee.  We were pretty straightforward about how we used the payroll, which a lot of 
offices weren’t in those days.  If you recall there was a big investigation in 1975. 
 
And, in fact, we had a bunch of volunteers who were sitting in the subcommittee office who had 
done some negative research on one of the candidates and their, it’s off the historical record, on 
McGovern during the primaries.  And we had a, it turned out, a secretary in our office who was 
sleeping with a Capitol policeman who was living at Jack Anderson’s.  And so all of a sudden, 
one, you know, Anderson calls me one night at midnight, having called Muskie I think the same 
time and Muskie just said, “Talk to me,” and was going through this payroll and, I mean, it was a 
pretty straightforward, able to show him how we used the payroll and the payroll all went for 
act-, (unintelligible phrase) government legitimate activities. 
 
But he did do a column on how Muskie was doing this stuff on, you know, that, it was pretty 
tough on McGovern during the primary contest.  And that after-, that day, just by coincidence, 
the day the column appeared, Muskie was campaigning with [George] McGovern.  And we had a 
government operations committee mark-up, so I was a little nervous, I mean I was in those days 
a little, I was, you know, twenties, in my twenties, and there’s old John McClellan who was not 
exactly known as the nicest guy in the world, and Muskie wasn’t around.  So I go into this mark-
up and McClellan, I walk in and McClellan says, “Come here.”  And I said, “Holy,” you know, 
“holy shit.”  And he just looked at me and he said, “Who’s the leak, we’re going to get him 
fired.”  And that was all.  I’ll never forget that. 
 
But how Muskie handled McClellan in the Budget Act, McClellan, who was a sponsor with, I 
think with Ervin, of the original Budget Act proposal.  Muskie was convinced that if, that if that 
act were enacted it would be so rigid that it would not work and furthermore it would limit the 
power of the appropriations committee in ways that he thought would be unacceptable to 
McClellan.  Well McClellan at that point, you know, came around very rarely to governmental 
operations committee stuff.  But I arranged with Jim Calloway for one mark-up to get McClellan 
to come.  And he came.  And then with Senator [Bill] Brock we, and I told him, the deal we 
made with McClellan and Calloway was that we would make sure there were no votes that day.  
So Brock was cued that every time a quorum went into the room he left, so there would never be 
a quorum in the room so nobody could ever force a vote.  And Muskie talked to McClellan for, 
you know, an hour or so basically, that was, you know, everybody else was there but that was 
what this was about.  And at the end of it McClellan says, “I can’t take this bill,” and that was 
how we got our compromise.  So the answer is he dealt very skillfully with him. 
 
DN:   Did he simply try to roll over them or did he try to get them to -? 
 
AF:    Well, there may have been some senators that he tried to roll over, but I think if Muskie 
respected him, a senator, he would, at least in my experience, he would usually try and almost 
always succeed in winning them over on his, the logic of his arguments. 
 
DN:   I’d like to drop back to the presidential campaign which you’ve mentioned.  You observed 
that as a member of the Senate staff and the staff of a subcommittee.  What did you feel about 
the way Senator Muskie was handling that campaign individually as a candidate, and as the 
campaign was evolving from the time you arrived in April?  No, no, you were there - 
 AF:    April of ‘71. 
 
DN:   Seventy-one. 
 
AF:    (Unintelligible phrase), that’s really an interesting question, and particularly in light of 
my subsequent experience of going, particularly going through the ‘92 campaign.  And 
incidentally this year traveling with Senator Lieberman on, for most of the last part of his 
campaign. 
 
I think my overall impression of that campaign, more than anything else, was that Ed Muskie 
probably, had he been the Democratic nominee, probably could have gotten elected in 1968 or 
1976 but not in 1972.  The circumstances, the anti-war feeling, just, and Muskie’s own nature 
just sort of conspired to make that an ill-fated effort, probably from the beginning.  That was the 
year McGovern changed the rules, the McGovern commission changed the rules, and McGovern 
knew the rules.  But, you know, the, and I think that, you know, McGovern took advantage of 
the rules that he had written in ways that Muskie never could have and probably, you know, I 
mean . . . . And the truth is maybe we weren’t good enough in the campaign that I suspect a lot 
of it was that, you know, all of us had grown up, and certainly Muskie had, in a system that was 
so entirely different that quick accommodation was not one of his great skills on this front. 
 
The other thing is that I think Mu-, from my, my over all impression is that Muskie was too 
thoughtful to be a good presidential candidate.  And I mean, I can re-, I remember so many times 
when we’d do speeches and give them to him and he’d say, you know, “I need to talk to Clark 
Clifford” or Charlie Shultz or somebody.  And by the time he’d finally get all the feedback done 
the idea had been stolen by somebody else. 
 
And I just, you know, I often felt in the 1992 campaign, and I don’t mean this in any disrespect 
to George Stephanopolis, but here’s George, a thirty-year-old kid on the plane with Clinton.  
And Clinton, who I personally believe is this incredibly talented guy, most talented, single most 
talented politician I’ve ever known and a very dear friend of mine.  But, you know, I cannot 
imagine Ed Muskie on the plane with a thirty-year-old kid making, you know, telling him he 
ought to do something and him doing it without checking with other people. 
 
Now Clinton, he was, the Clinton circumstance was sort of interest-, it was a little different in a 
sense, because I always believed with Clinton, we’d spent two years together developing the 
message that he ran on, so I never worried about Clinton because I figured George would never 
give him, if George gave him bad advice Clinton would instinctively do the right thing, which I 
think he did most of the campaign. 
 
But in the, but Muskie was a guy who wanted to talk to his advisors, his senior advisors, and he 
had the best, I mean Clark Clifford, Paul Warnke and Charlie Shultz and probably a lot of others 
that I didn’t know because I was pretty young in those days, and Harry McPherson and others.  
The, and so, you know, that’s not a g-, that temperament doesn’t work any more.  I mean, being 
on the airplane with Lieberman this year, and you probably did this in ‘68, but you know, things 
happen so fast now and you just got to . . . .  I mean my role on the airplane with Joe was as his 
friend to say, “Wait a minute, the campaign wants you to do this but, you know, this isn’t you, 
you know, and you got to make sure you do it in a way, if you’re going to do, if you’re going to 
make this argument you got to do it in a way that is credible and that works for you.”  The, but 
the pressures over here are so fast and when you’re the presidential candidate it’s much tougher. 
 
And I just think as we got into the sort of breaking into the information age of politics, the kind 
of skills and the kind of speed that it demanded, it was sort of apparent, abhorrent to Muskie’s 
nature.  The other thing, I think, is that I just sensed that Muskie probably didn’t have the 
physical stamina that, and I remember the stories in the campaign that Muskie would get up, you 
know, get up in the morning to campaign, Humphrey was already out campaigning.  And then 
he’d come in at night and a little later he’d see Humphrey coming in at night.  The, you know, 
but so I just thought, and of course the overwhelming factor was the Vietnam war and how it just 
skewed our politics that year.  I just thought that for a combination of reasons that ‘72 being the 
first transition year into a new system, and Muskie’s nature, and the war, it just wasn’t his year, 
but he would’ve been a great president. 
 
DN:   You mentioned earlier that many of the ideas and concepts of the Democratic Party and 
politics that you developed in the Democratic Leadership Council came from your Muskie years, 
and I’d like you to talk a little bit about that and how that emerged. 
 
AF:    Well, Muskie taught me a lot about politics.  I mean all this is old hat to you because you 
lived it with him, I just, he just told me about it.  But, you know, one of the lessons he always 
told me is, one of the things he always told me is that we, to have, whenever we introduced a 
major bill we had to have a Republican co-sponsor, chief co-sponsor.  Not just on the bill but a 
chief co-sponsor, so it was always Muskie-Brock, Muskie- [Willliam V., Jr.] Roth, Muskie-
Percy, whatever it was in our committee.  And the reason he always used to say was because 
when I was governor of Maine we didn’t have enough Democrats in the legislature to sustain a 
veto so I needed to work with Republicans.  Well that was a very important lesson because it 
leads to more centrist politics when you have to work with the other side.  As Bill Brock once 
told me, as we were fighting some fight and Brock was our chief co-sponsor, he said, “When you 
got Ed Muskie and Bill Brock on a bill, there’s a lot of people in the middle to get, so we’re 
going to get the votes.” 
 
But Muskie had that sort of Yankee streak of fiscal responsibility in it and the, you know, one of 
the things that I spent a good part of my time with Muskie working on were things like the 
Budget Act and the Sunset Bill.  And I remember going up, when Muskie did his speech to the 
Liberal Party in New York in 1975 and did that great line about, “It’s time for liberals to start 
talking about fiscal responsibility without feeling uncomfortable.”  When he spoke to the 
platform committee in 1976 and it was, we were doing the Sunset Bill, and he talked about 
Roosevelt’s legacy of innovation. 
 
Well those are things that have become the core of the New Democrat movement, you know, as I 
define the New Democrat movement that sort of shaped the policies of the Clinton 
administration, the Clinton candidacy and allowed him, I think, to win.  I mean, fiscal discipline 
was right at the core of that.  Muskie was the first guy in the Democratic Party to understand the 
importance of it, you know, and our first principle is, that we always talk about is opportunity for 
all, that in the information age and the 21st century if you’re going to be a party of opportunity 
you got to be a party of private sector economic growth.  And that means the government has to 
get its fiscal house in order.  It’s a first principle, core principle of this movement, what we’re 
probably more noted for than anything else.  I mean, you know, if you think about it, after three 
decades of deficits it was a new Democratic president who had given us our first balanced 
budget.  Well, a lot of the, you know, the intellectual strand that led to that came out of the 
Muskie years. 
 
The whole idea of innovation in government, one of the most important things that Clinton did 
was, is reinventing government initiative that was led by the vice president.  But even more than 
that what we, that sort of a core principle is party that believed in activist government, that we 
believed that you always had to modernize government.  To this day, whenever I speak I always 
use the Roosevelt quote from the Commonwealth Club speech that new conditions impose new 
requirements on government and those who conduct government.  That’s been a mantra of this 
movement.  Muskie recognized that.  It’s right at the core of his platform committee’s testimony 
in 1976 when nobody was talking about it. 
 
So, you know, you take that and you take things like the Kennedy ethic of civic responsibility 
and the importance of internationalism and values.  I mean all those kind of things which, a lot of 
which I learned from Ed Muskie, and in importance from Ed Muskie, those are, that’s the way 
we redefined our party.  And in fact when Muskie died, I did a column in the New Democrat 
magazine where I went back, and we can find this for you if you haven’t seen it.  We went, went 
back to the early Muskie speeches and sort of traced how I think they were the antecedent for 
really what led to the Clinton presidency. 
 
DN:   Are people like President Clinton aware of that heritage, or lineage? 
 
AF:    Probably to some degree, but probably not as much as they ought to be.  I’m sure that, you 
know, the, I would guess that President Clinton is a little, is somewhat aware of it but probably 
not, you know, doesn’t, I’m not sure that he would think of the Muskie, of the Muskie years of 
the seventies as, as being as much the antecedent of it as maybe the Gillis Long years of the 
1980s in the House Democratic caucus where, which, first again, where we sort of resurrected it. 
 But the intellec-, I mean the intellectual strands, I mean all of them, because I was the, sort of 
the coherent link in all this.  It went back to Muskie.  And Muskie shaped the kind of politics 
that, you know, has forever driven Maine.  And the, our deal, I mean in, when I went to work 
after, when I left Muskie I went to work for two years - 
 
(Outside interruption.) 
 
DN:   I’d like to ask you if you would to review your career since ‘78 when you left the staff. 
 
AF:    Well, I left the staff when, in, at the end of 1978 when Muskie left the government 
operations committee and went on foreign relations.  And he actually offered to move me and 
most of my staff over to the budget committee.  But I decided, I came to a very important career 
decision which was that in the Senate there was no natural progression from staff director to 
senator.  And so I left, went down to the White House, worked for two years as deputy advisor to 
the president on inflation, I’m embarrassed to tell you that, for Jimmy Carter.  As, I was a deputy 
to Alfred Kahn, and which now gives me great joke lines when I speak, because I always thank 
whoever introduces me because they never tell, they never say that, for not reminding people 
that I was deputy advisor for President Carter on inflation, and that for those who thought Carter 
couldn’t do anything, get anything done, we got the inflation rate up higher than the president’s 
positive ratings in the polls.  But in any event, and then in - 
 
DN:   (Unintelligible phrase) one could observe by the way that you were doing precisely what 
you started doing for Sargent Schriver in looking around and then reporting on what you found. 
 
AF:    Right, right, that’s exactly right.  The, but then in, obviously President Carter was beaten 
in 1980 and I became staff director of the House Democratic caucus for a wonderful guy who, 
named Gillis Long, who died in 1985.  But Gillis Long was a congressman in the Long family 
from central Louisiana.  He always said he was from the poor part of the family and in fact part 
of his health problems were, was that, part of his health problem was that he had malnutrition as 
a kid. 
 
But Gillis was a remarkable man who got elected in 1963 or ‘62 from redneck central Louisiana 
and came up and made his first vote to expand the rules committee so civil rights legislation 
could get out, and got beat in 1964 by his cousin Speedy [Oteria] Long who ran against him as 
the man who voted against the south.  But Gillis, like Muskie, was a man of great principle.  And 
when he finally came back up after the Voting Rights Act to call the blacks in his district 
(unintelligible phrase) voters, he was fearless because he figured, you know, what’s the worst 
that could happen to me is I get beat again, right.  He’d already had that happen, and he did quite 
well.  But Gillis put together a group.  I became, he got elected chairman of the Democratic 
caucus in December of 1980 and hired me immediately to be staff director.  And we began 
working with a group of young members of Congress including Dick Gephardt and Al Gore, Les 
Aspen, Geraldine Ferraro in those days, Bill Gray, to really begin to modernize the Democratic 
Party, to change its message. 
 
And a lot of the stuff we did, because I was doing a lot of the staff work on it, went back to the 
Muskie years because we’d sort of had that hiatus in the Carter years.  But I think, you know, the 
political impetus for what we’d done with Muskie was we had this ‘72 debacle and we had to get 
this party back to the mainstream again so we could win.  And so having gone through another 
debacle in 1980 these young House guys were interested in it and we started doing a lot of the 
idea stuff that then eventually led in the, after the [Walter] Mondale election in ‘84, to the 
creation of the Democratic Leadership Council. 
 
And, you know, I think, but because there was a direct linkage between the House caucus 
activities and the DLC, most people who study the history will, you know, go back to the House 
caucus but not to the Muskie years.  And, you know, in a sense the Muskie, the link to the 
Muskie years was, you know, was that I was part of both things.  But in any event, my own 
career, I did the House caucus from 1981 to 1985.  I was about ready to become staff director of 
the joint economic committee in 1985, in January 1985.  And two days before Gillis was 
supposed to be elected chairman and I was going to be staff director, he died of a heart attack 
and . . . .  But we were in the process of organizing what then became, was to become the DLC 
and Sam Knight and a bunch of those senators who we worked with came to me and asked me to 
do the DLC and I started that in 1985.  I’ve been here ever since, and 1989 we put together the 
Progressive Policy Institute. 
 
And in 1991, April of 1991 I did the smartest thing I’ve ever done in my life which is I went 
down to Little Rock, Arkansas and I said to a young governor, I said, “I got a deal for you.  If 
you become chairman of the DLC we’ll pay for your travel around the country, we’ll help you 
do an agenda, and you’re going to be president some day and we’re going to both be important.” 
 And he said, “I’ll do it,” and he did, and the rest is history. 
 
DN:   What led you to Bill Clinton at that point? 
 
AF:    Clinton was one of the original guys who signed on when we started the deal, see.  He 
started getting active in 1987.  And interestingly enough the link was the Muskie link, at least 
my first link to Clinton, because Bruce Lindsey who was Clinton’s, you know, sort of number 
one alter ego, I had known from the Muskie days because his wife, his former wife Bev, worked 
for Muskie as a secretary.  And so I’d known, Bruce at that point was working for McClellan, or 
for [Mark] Pryor I think up here, and so I knew him.  And so when, after we formed the DLC 
and Clinton was part of it but not particularly active I called Bruce and said, “Why don’t we get 
him to this event.”  And he came and from that point on he was hooked. 
 
And he, in 1988, in ‘89, it was actually Jan-, I’m sorry, it was April of ‘89 when I went down, 
I’m sorry, not even ‘91, April of ‘89 I went down to Little Rock.  But in, you know, throughout 
‘88 and ‘89 he came to a bunch of DLC events and I just looked at this guy and said, “I’ve never 
seen a political talent like this, this guy will be president.”  And so I just went down there and 
asked him, he said sure, and, but the . . . .  I mean Clinton has, had, has a lot of the intellectual 
capacities that Muskie had but he, but he is sort a deft modern politician, he has no peer.  As we 
have learned. 
 
DN:   Now, you mentioned the House caucus which you staffed.  There was no comparable 
group in the Senate, although you said you worked with senators. 
 
AF:    The, well the group, the House caucus is the, I mean there is a Senate caucus.  It just, and 
they meet every, I guess they meet every Tuesday.  But the House caucus is, believe it or not, it’s 
the organization of all House Democrats and it has had sort of a, you know an, up and down 
history.  It is the, believe it or not, it is the oldest political institution in the United States other 
than the speakership of the House.  But, the House Democratic caucus is, but the, it goes through 
periods where it doesn’t do anything but organize the House and then it doesn’t do . . . . What we 
did in part because Gillis was sort of the guru of the young members and, again, I guess because 
he and I were both pretty aggressive, when he took over the chairmanship the reason he came to 
me was, he said this can be a really, a vehicle for reform. 
 
And we, the House in those days when he took over had open meetings and so it never met and 
did any business because everybody was using it to posture.  And we closed the meetings and 
put together a small committee in the House to really begin thinking about new ideas.  And Tip 
was always a little suspicious of us but, in part because Dick Bolling, who was Tip’s closest ally, 
was also Gillis’ best friend.  Bolling always kept Tip from absolutely crushing us.  And we were 
smart enough to figure out that we had to play in venues that were outside the official activity of 
the House and so as we did these policies to try to redefine the party we’d aim it with the mid-
term party conference and not trying to turn them into legislation and those kind of things, and 
got these young guys to write, to basically agree on these policy papers that began to ironically 
define the party in a lot of ways that Muskie tried to do through his legislative actions. 
 
And we also crea-, in those years created the super delegates because as you recall in the 1980 
Democratic convention the only thirty-nine members of the House who even went is delegates.  
And we thought that part of the reason the party was going way out, the presidential party had 
lost sort of its way was because people who got elected to office weren’t participating in it 
anymore.  And so we created the super delegates during those years when I was in the caucus. 
 
And the, then in 1984 when it became clear that Mondale was going to get just clobbered, I went 
to [Robert] Strauss and Gillis and I had talked about trying to bring in governors and senators.  
And Chuck Robb those days was governor of Virginia and head of the Democratic governors 
and we started working with him, and Strauss connected us with a group of senators that 
included [Samuel] Nunn and Lawton [Mainor] Chiles [Jr.] in those days and, about twelve or 
thirteen senators, Gore became one of the originals.  He was actually in those days on our House 
caucus committee.  And the, part of that effort, those sort of discussions, when Gillis left, had to 
leave the caucus because of the caucus rules, we decided to try to put together this group that 
included senators, governors and House members to try to reshape the presidential party after we 
lost forty-nine states.  And I wrote the memo that sort of triggered all this, and they came to me 
and said, “Okay, figure out how it ought to be organized.” 
 
All that time I was going to be chairman, or I was going to be the director of the House, or the 
Joint Economic Committee but when Gillis died that wasn’t going to happen.  And so they came 
to me and said, “Why don’t you do the DLC?”  And my friend, Chuck Robb, who just lost his 
senate seat but to whom I will always be grateful, said to me in 1985 when I said, you know, “I’d 
like to do this but, you know, I can’t do it for three months and then have it go under.”  And he 
said, “I will guarantee to pay your salary for a year even if it goes under after three months if 
you’ll do this.”  And he did, and I did, and it didn’t go under. 
 
DN:   Did you ever discuss the DLC with Senator Muskie? 
 
AF:    It was never even, well, I’m sure, I’m sure, yes.  In, you know, one of the, in, but not, you 
know, not in great detail I’m sure but one of the most important things and one of the things that 
I’m most pleased I ever did is doing the stuff about the Muskie Center at the University of 
Southern Maine.  And we had a little committee that used to meet and, you know, for a while, 
and I seldom went to any of the meetings.  Lee Lockwood, who worked with Senator Muskie 
and with me, with Senator Muskie and has intermittently worked with me ever since, including 
at the DLC for a while, used to always represent me. 
 
And for one, some reason or another about two or three months before Muskie died we were 
having one of these and I said, I’m going to go this time and I had to spend, you know, a couple 
of hours with him and I’m really delighted that I did.  You know, I don’t really remember having 
any detailed conversations with Muskie even though I’m, you know, I’m just trying to jog my 
memory about this.  We did talk a little bit about it I think at the ‘88 convention because it turned 
out that, in fact the guy who’s in the office next to me here, works for me, Ed Killgore, wound 
up writing Muskie’s speech to the ‘88 convention and I think we talked about it a little then but, 
you know, not at any great length. 
 
DN:   As you look back on the times, particularly in close observation of Senator Muskie, are 
there any other aspects of either his career or his contributions to American public service that 
strike you? 
 
AF:    Well, yeah, one that’s very important and probably again had a lot to do with some of the 
stuff that I’ve done in my career.  Muskie believed that politics was an honorable profession, and 
the, it was, I remember those discussions, a lot of discussions with him about that because we 
went through a period when on our committee everybody was trying to limit, you know, do all 
the lobbying reform acts and all those kinds of things.  Muskie was always very hesitant on all 
that stuff.  Muskie thought, you know, that public service was an honorable profession and he 
didn’t think it ought to be treated as if they were a bunch of crooks.  And, you know, that always 
made a very, very big impression on me. 
 
I believe, you know, I believe that politics, you know, there are a lot of people who want to take 
politics out of government and, you know, Muskie sort of taught me that politics and government 
are intertwined and it’s what makes our democracy work.  I’ll tell you one story that to me, 
actually I think I ended my column on Muskie with this, one of the great lessons Muskie taught 
me about our system of governing. 
 
In 1973, February and March 1973, Watergate was just beginning to unravel.  We were having a 
hearing in, at IGR, and we had this new young group of Democratic governors from the south 
including Carter and I think Bumpers, and John West, and I can’t remember, and the 
Republicans asked if they could have [A.] Linwood Holton come up to testify.  He was head of 
the governors’ association so we basically had to let him do it.  And we’re doing this hearing, it’s 
probably on Nixon’s new federalism, and this shows, this is sort of an indication of the ti-, of the 
differences in today and those days.  At eleven o’clock was the wire service deadline in those 
days for the afternoon papers, and at a quarter of eleven Holton interrupts and goes through this 
outburst about attacking the Senate and Senator Mansfield for being inefficient and not moving 
President Nixon’s program and all this kind of stuff.  And Muskie leaned over to me, and I’ll 
never forget this as long as I live, he said, “You know, in a few months we’re going to appreciate 
the inefficiencies of the Senate, because they will have saved our liberties.”  And, you know, the, 
I mean, I guess to me the Muskie years, I mean I’ve been blessed.  I’ve been blessed with an 
incredible array of experiences in my life and, but to me, you know, in many ways in a sense of 
developing my own political philosophy the Muskie years were the formative years. 
 
And so I just look back and say that, you know, I was blessed to have that opportunity.  I was 
honored, you know, there were all, a lot of people who dealt with Senator Muskie found him 
very difficult to deal with because he had a temper.  I figured out a very simple way to deal with 
him, I was able, you know, I seldom, you know, it wasn’t that he never yelled at me, but I mean I 
learned how to parry those outbursts and I just enjoyed so much the opportunity to learn and to 
do things that, you know, I never dreamed I’d be able to do.  And that sort of launched my, you 
know, it was another, sort of another major launching point in my career, so those were, those 
are great years. 
 
And I just hope that Senator Muskie’s contribution to the political debate is, you know, is 
appreciated so this is, it’s a good thing that you’re doing this.  You know, as I’ve looked back at 
the President Clinton years that were scarred by impeachment but, you know, Clinton has played 
an enormous role in modernizing progressive politics all over the world.  I mean, if you look at 
what’s happened in England with Tony Blair and in Germany with [Gerhard] Schroeder and in 
Latin America with [Fernando] Cardoso and [Ricardo] Lagos (unintelligible phrase), it’s, you 
know, an incredible contribution and a lot of the antecedents to that third way philosophy came 
in the Muskie years so I hope he gets credit. 
 
DN:   Thank you very much, Al. 
 
End of Interview 
